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808 PEOPLE 11. VARNUM [66 C.2d 
(Crim. No. 10190. In Bank. May 31, 1967.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. THOMAS 
LAMAS V ARNUM, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law - Evidence - Sufficiency - Circumstantial Evi-
dence: Homicide - Evidence - Sufficiency. - There was sufti-
cient evidence to support verdicts of robbery, kidnaping, and 
murder, where a witness saw a service station attendant leave 
the station, where he was on duty alone, in the company of 
three men, where the station owner subsequently discovered 
$50 missing from the cash register, where the attendant's 
empty wallet and his body were found and he had been shot, 
where defendant and his accomplices were heard planning the 
robbery, and later discussing their having killed the victim, 
and were seen dividing the money after the robbery and giving 
some of it to a neighbor for the use of a gun, and where 
defendant's fingerprints were found at the service station, and 
a ballistics expert testified that the bullets had been fired by a 
gun such as the one defendant had taken with him. 
[Sa, 2b] ld.-Evidence-Weapons.-Where, in a prosecution for 
robbery, kidnaping, and murder, the location of the murder 
wel;Lpon was learned from non-coercive questioning of an 
accomplice and his wife who had not been warned of their 
constitutional rights, defendant did not have standing to 
challenge the violation of these rights and the gun could be 
used in evidence against him. 
[3] ld.-Rights of Accused-As to Aid of Counsel and Remaining 
Silent.-There is nothing unlawful in questioning & suspect 
who has not been warned of his constitutional rights so long 
as the police refrain from physically and psychologically 
coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not use 
against the suspect any evidence obtained. 
[4a, 4b] Witnesses-Impeachment-Prior Conviction. - Where, 
during defendant's trial for robbery, kidnaping, and murder, & 
prosecution witness who had already been convicted for lend-
ing the murder weapon to defendant for the purpose of the 
contemplated robbery claimed his privilege against self-
incrimination, whereupon the trial court brought out the fact 
that he w~s no longer subject to prosecution because he had 
already been convicted and ordered him to answer the ques-
tions, but where the witness then denied any personal involve-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 585; Homicide, 
§ 145(3); [2] Criminal Law, § 536(1); [3] Criminal Law, § 106.5; 
[4,5] Witnesses, § 227; [6, 9] Criminal Law, §§ 572, 1011; [7, 8] 
Criminal Law, § 1011. 
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ment and any knowledge of defendant's having taken part in 
the crimes, no error was committed by the court even if its 
purpose had been to impeach the witness instead of to rule on 
his claim of privilege. 
[6] Id.-Impeachment-Prior Conviction.-In a criminal prosecu-
tion it is entirely proper for the court to elicit the fact that a 
witness has been convicted as an accomplice in the crime 
charged. 
[6] Crimjnal Law - Judgment - Determination of Punishment-
Procedure for Determining Penalty: Evidence-Accomplices 
and Corroboration.-There was reversible error where, during 
the penalty phase of a trial for kidnaping and murder, the 
prosecution encouraged the jury to aggravate defendant's pun-
ishment by evidence consisting solely of testimony of a witness 
who claimed to be defendant's accomplice in robberies com-
mitted shortly before those for which he was tried, and where 
this evidence, contrary to statute (Pen. Code, § 1111), was 
uncorroborated. 
[7] Id.-Judgment-Determination ~f Punishment-Procedure for 
Determining Penalty.-Although evidence of an earlier crime 
may be introduced at a trial of the penalty phase of a first 
degree murder case, such evidence must meet the rules of 
admissibility governing proof of that crime or be otherwise 
properly admissible in the penalty proceeding. 
[8] Id. - Judgment - Determination of Penalty - Procedure for 
Determining Penalty.-At a trial on the issue of penalty the 
corpus delicti of an earlier crime must be established before 
an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession can be admitted, 
and an earlier crime cannot be proved by hearsay. 
[9] Id -Judgment-Determination of Punishment-Procedure 
for Determining Penalty: Evidence-Accomplices and Cor-
roboration.-Pen. Code, § 1111, prohibiting proof of an earlier 
crime by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, also 
. applies at a trial on the issue of penalty. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. John G. Barnes, Judge. Reversed in part 
and affirmed in part. 
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit robbery, first 
degree robbery, kidnaping with bodily harm for the purpose 
of robbery, and first degree murder. Judgment of conviction 
imposing death penalty on murder charge and fixing penalty 
. [6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 270 et seq. 
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for kidnaping at life imprisonment reversed insofar as it re-
lates to penalty; affirmed in all other respects. 
Thomas Lamas Varnum, in pro. per., and Lester M. Fleisch-
ner, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Gordon Ringer, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-A jury found defendant guilty of as-
sault with intent to commit robbery, first degree robbery, kid-
naping with bodily harm for the purpose of robbery, and first 
degree murder. It fixed the penalty for kidnaping at life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole and the penalty for 
murder at death. A motion for new trial was denied. The 
appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
At a previous trial the jury fixed the penalty at death for 
the kidnaping and murder. We reversed the jUdgment only as 
to penalty because of errors condemned in People v. Morse 
(1964) 60 Ca1.2d 631 [36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33]. (People 
v. Varn:um (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 425 [38 Cal.Rptr. 881, 392 P.2d 
961] .) Before retrial, however, we issued a writ of habeas 
corpus and reversed the judgment in its entirety on the 
ground that confessions introduced in evidence had been ob-
tained in violation of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 
[12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758]. The judgment was not final 
when Escobedo was decided. (In re Varnum (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 
629 [47 Cal.Rptr. 769, 408 P.2d 97].) On this appeal defend-
ant does not challenge his conviction of assault with ,intent to 
rob James Fields. He challenges only his conviction of the 
robbery, kidnaping, and murder of Norman :Merrill. 
[1] On the evening of August 16, 1962, Merrill, a. service 
station attendant, was on duty alone. A witness saw him leave 
in the company of three male Negroes, one of whom was driv-
ing a customer's automobile that was regularly parked at the 
station. Summoned to the service station,the owner dis-
(~overed that about $50 was missing from the cash register. 
Early the next day Merrill's wallet containing no money was 
fOllnd in the street about 10 miles from the station. That 
afternoon his body was discovered face down in a mainte-
nance yard near the place where his wallet had been found. 
He hnd been shot twice in the back. 
..,.. 
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The transcript testimony of John Ashton Victoria, who tes-
tified at the first trial but could not be located for the second, 
was the most damaging evidence against defendant. At the 
time of the crime Victoria, a schoolboy, fry cook, and busboy, 
was living with Edward Jackson who was convicted with de-
fendant at the first trial. Victoria recounted an evening meet-
ing in Jackson's apartment where defendant and his accom-
plices planned the robbery. They had one gun, and a neigh-
bor, Thomas Hanks, lent them another, a Colt, which defend-
ant carried in the waistband of his trousers when they left the 
apartment. They returned about midnight. Victoria testified 
that defendant gave the Colt to Hanks and that the trio dis-
cussed their having killed the victim. Defendant divided the 
money among the three conspirators, and each gave some to 
Hanks for the use of his gun. . 
Defendant's fingerprints were found at the service station 
on the cardboard box in which credit receipts were kept anll 
on the horn ring and the inside of the left front window of 
the car used to kidnap the victim. A ballistics .expert testified 
that the lethal bullets had been fired by a Colt such as the one 
Victoria testified defendant had taken with him. 
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to support the verdicts. 
[2a] Defendant contends, however, that the trial court 
erred in admitting the alleged murder weapon into evidence, 
on the ground that it was located as a result of interrogations 
conducted without theprelimiuary protections required by 
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 
8.Ct. 1758], and People v. Dorado (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 
Cal.Rptr. 169,398 P.2d 361]. 
Police offiers conducted a fruitless search for the gun 
throughout the building where the Jacksons lived. They then 
prevailed upon Jackson, who was in jail and had confessed, to 
telephone his wife, who was in the women's jail, and ask her 
to reveal the Jliding place of the gun. Mrs .• Jackson said it was 
in the fuse box in the hallway of the apartment building, 
where an officer later found it. The officers thus learned of the 
hiding place of the gun from both Jackson and his wife who 
had not been advised of their constitutional rights. 1'he in-
quiry had focused on both of them, and they were not in 
custody merely as potential witnesses but had been handcuffpd 
while being transported to jail and had been booked for the 
murder. A1though Mrs. Jackson was not prosecuted for the 
offense, she was entitled to be advised of her rights before 
being subjected to police inspired and supervised questioning 
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by her husband while she was in custody charged with mur-
der. The information elicited from Victoria that implicated 
defendant also implicated Jackson as a direct participant and 
indicated that his wife might have encouraged commission of 
the robbery. 
Under these circumstances information and physical evi-
dence secured as a result of questioning the Jacksons without 
warning them of their rights could not be used against them. 
(People v. Stoner (1967) 65 Ca1.2d 595, 600 [55 Oal.Rptr. 
897, 422 P.2d 585] ; People v. Dorado, supra, 62 Oa1.2d 338, 
353-354; People v. Bilderbach (1965) 62 Oa1.2d 757, 763-767 
[44 Cal.Rptr. 31:3, 401 P.2d 921] ; People v. Ditson (1962) 57 
Ca1.2d 415, 439 [20 Oal.Rptr. 165, 369 P.2d 714].) The ques-
tion remains, however, whether defendant has standing to 
challenge the violations of the Jacksons' rights. 
In c~scs of searches and seizures conducted in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment we have held that the defendant has 
standing to object even when his own rights were not violated. 
(People v. Martin (1955) 45 Ca1.2d 755, 760-761 [290 P.2Jl __ 
855].) Otherwise the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rulc 
would be seriously weakened. Defendant contends that we 
should apply the same rule to Escobedo-Dorado-Miranda viola-
tions effectively to deter unlawful police interrogations. Non-
coercive questioning is not in itself unlawful, however, and 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights protected by Esco-
bedo, DMado, and M'iranda are violated only when evidence 
obtained without the required warnings and waiver is intro.-
duced against the person whose questioning produced the evi. 
dence. The basis for the warnings required by Miranda is the 
privilege against self-incrimination (Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) 384 U.S. 436, 457-470 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 713-721, 
86 8.0t. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974]), and that privilege is 
not violated when the information elicited from an unwarned 
suspect is not used against him. (See Murphy v. Waterfront 
Com. of New ¥o-rk Harbor (1964) 378 U.S. 52, 78-79 [12 
hEd.2d 678, 694-695, 84 8.0t. 1594].) Similarly the right to 
counsel protected by Escobedo and Dorado is not infringed 
when the exclm;ion of any evidence obtained through the viola-
tion of the rules of those cases precludes any 'interference 
with the suspect's right to effective representation. (See Mas-
siah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 206-207 [12 L.Ed. 
~d 246, 250-251, 84 S.Ct. 1]991.) [3] Unlike unreasonable 
searches and seizures, whidl always violate the Constitution, 
there is nothing ullla\'dul ill questioning an unwarneu suspect 
-) 
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so long as the police refrain from physically and psychologi-
cally coercive tactics condemned by due process and do not 
use against the suspect any evidence obtained. l [2b] Ac-
cordingly, in the absence of such coercive tactics, there is no 
basis for excluding physical or other nonhearsay evidence 
acquired as a result of questioning a suspect in disregard of 
his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when such evidence is 
offered at the trial of another person. 
[4a] Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in 
impeaching Thomas Hanks, a witness called by the prosecu-
tion. Hanks had already been convicted and sentenced to 
prison for his part in the crimes, and the prosecution called 
him to testify that he lent the murder weapon to defendant 
_ for the purpose of the contemplated robbery. When Hanks 
took the stand he claimed his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. Proceeding in the presence of the jury, the trial court 
brought out the fact that Hanks was no longer subject to 
prosecution because he had already been convicted. It there-
fore ordered him to answer the questions. Hanks then denied 
any personal involvement and any knowledge of defendant's 
having take;n part in the crimes. 
The information elicited by the trial court did not establish 
for this jury the facts that were the basis for Hanks' convic-
tion. Its only effect was to impeach Hanks' testimony by show-
ing his prior conviction of a felony. No error was committed 
thereby even if the court's purpose had been to impeach 
Hanks instead of to rule on his claim of privilege.2 The risks 
of abuse that had been thought to justify the now discredited 
rule against a party's impeaching his own witness (see Evid. 
Code, §§ 785, 788, operative January 1, 1967, repealing the 
lIn MGUiah v. United State., Il'Upra, the court was careful to point out 
the distinction between the legality of secret surveillance and questioning 
of an indicted defendant and the unconstitutionality of the use of evi-
dence so obtained against him. "We do not question that in this ease, as 
in many eases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the 
euspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged confeder-
ates, even though the defendant had already been indicted. All that we 
hold is that the defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained by 
tederal agents under the circumstances here disclosed, could not constitu-
tionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial." 
(377 U.S. at p. 207, 12 L.Ed.2d at p. 251.) 
2Even though the questioning by the trial court elicited facts that may 
have impeached the credibility of the witness, it did not intimate that the 
eourt doubted his credibility or convey any impression to the jury as to 
the attitude of the court on anl issue in the case. (See People v. 
SflatOB'lW (1911) 161 Cal. 636, 640 L119 P. 1083]; People v. Soeder (1906) 
150 Cal. 12, 18-19 [87 P. 1016].) 
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rule against a party impeaching his own witness; 3 Wigmore, 
Evidence, § 896 et seq.) are absent when the impeachment is 
undertaken by the court. [5] It is entirely proper for the 
court to elicit the fact that a witness has been convicted as an 
accomplice in the crime charged. (United States v. Crosby (2d 
Cir. 1961) 294 F.2d 928, 948; Wood v. United States (8th Cir. 
1960) 279 F.2<l 359, 363; Davenport v. United States (9th Cir. 
1958) 260 F.2d 591, 596; Richards v. United States (10th Cir. 
1951) 193 F.2d 554, 556; Nemec v. United States (9th Cir. 
1949) 178 F.2d 656, 661; see also United States v. Jannsen 
(7th Cir. 1964) 339 F.2d 916, 919; United States V. Aronson 
(2d Cir. 1963) 319 F.2d 48, 51-52; United States V. Freeman 
(2d Cir. 1962) 302 F.2d 347, 350, cert. den. (1963) 375 U.S. 
958 [11 L.Ed.2d 316, 84 8.0t. 448].) [4b] Any impeach-
ment in this case was incidental to the court's inquiry into 
Hanks' Fifth Amendment privilege, but the court would have 
been well advised to make that inquiry outside the presence of 
the jury to avoid any possibility of inadvertent prejudice. Its 
failure to do so, however, resulted in no error for it merely 
brought out impeaching evidence the jury could properly 
hear.' 
[6] Error committed in the penalty phase of the trial, 
however, requires reversal. (People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal2d 
164, 170 [37 Cal.Rptr. 622, 390 P.2d 398].) The prosecution 
encouraged the jury to aggravate defendant's punishment by-
evidence that he had committed other robberies shortly before 
those for which he was tried. This evidence consisted solely of 
the testimony of Thomas Hanks, who claimed to be defend-
ant's accomplice in the earlier escapades. Penal Code section 
1111 provides that "A conviction cannot be had upon the 
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated. . . ." 
Although no "conviction" was involved at the trial on the 
issue of penalty, section 1111 cannot be construed to apply 
only to the trial on the issue of guilt, for it was enacted long 
before the adoption of separate trials of those issues.4 
[7] We have held that" evidence of the earlier crime must 
SDefendant contends that in its instructions on the law of accomplice 
responsibility the trial court in effect directed the jury to find him guilty. 
The court instructed that if anyone had committed the crimes charged, 
then Hanks, as a matter of law, was an accomplice. Because the jury 
already knew that Hanks had been convicted for his part in the crimes, 
defendant argues, the jury could only conclude that he was defendant'e 
accomplice. The instruction, however, like the revelation of Hanks' eon· 
viction, in no way connected defendant with Hanks. 
4Pen. Code, § 1111, was enacted in 1872. The penalty trial procedure 
provided by Pen. Code, § 190.1, was not established until 1957. 
-.. 
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meet the rules of admissibility governing proof of that crime 
or be otherwise properly admissible in the penalty proceed-
ing." (People v. Purvis (1961) 56 Ca1.2d 93, 97 [13 Cal. 
Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 713] ; People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal. 
2d 105, 129-131 [32 Cal.Rptr. 4, 383 P.2d 412]; People v. 
Bentley (1962) 58 Ca1.2d 458, 460-461 [24 Cal.Rptr. 685, 374 
P.2d 645].) [8] Moreover, because evidence of other crimes 
C'may have a particularly damaging impact on the jury's 
determination whether the defendant should be executed 
• . ." they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before 
the jury may consider them. (People v. Polk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 
443, 450 [47 Cal.Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641] ; see also People v . 
Terry (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 137, 149 [37 Cal.Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 
381].) Accordingly, at the trial on the issue of penalty the 
corpus delicti of an earlier crime must be established before 
an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession can be admitted 
(People v. Hamilton, supra), and an earlier crime cannot be 
proved by hearsay (People v. Purvis, supra). [9] For the 
same reasons Penal Code section 1111, prohibiting proof of an 
earlier crime by the uncorroborated testimony of an accom-
plice, also applies at the trial on the issue of p~nalty. 
The error in admitting the accomplice te~timony was sub-
stantial, and it is reasonably probable that a result more favor-
able to defendant would have been reached in the absence of 
the error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13-; People v. Hines, supra, 
61 Ca1.2d 164, 170; People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 
137.) 
The judgment is reversed insofar as it relates to penalty. In 
all other respects, it is affirmed. 
Tobriner, J., Sullivan, J., and White, J., t concurred. 
PETERS, J.-I concur with the majority in the reversal as 
to penalty, but I dissent insofar as the majority affirm the 
balance of the judgment challenged by defendant. That too 
should be reversed. 
At the trial there was introduced the murder weapon, a 
most important piece of evidence for the prosecution. This 
gun had been discovered by the police as a direct result of the 
improper interrogation of Edward Jackson and his wife, also 
-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8. 1966. 
tBetiredAssociate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
l 
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charged with the murder here involved. The majority opinion 
frankly admits that the interrogation of the Jacksons was at 
the accusatory stage-they were both in jail charged with the 
murder, suspicion had focused on them, and the questions 
were asked to elicit incriminating information against Var-
num as well as the Jacksons. Admittedly, the interrogation of 
the Jacksons violated the rules laid down in Escobedo v. Illi-
nois, 378 U.S. 478 [12 L.Ed.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People 
v. Dorado, 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361]. 
'fhere can be 110 doubt that had this evidence been offered 
against the Jacksons they could properly have objected to its 
admission into evidence. But, say the majority, Varnum, also 
charged with the murder, has no "standing" to challenge the 
invasion of the Jacksons' constitutional rights. If this holding 
is correct then a big hole has been blown in the barriers erect-
ed by Escobedo, and its progeny. The beneficent purposes 
intended by Escobedo and the more recent case of Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 8.Ct. 1602, 10 
A.L.R.3d 974], have been to a great extent defeated. I am 
convinced that the United States Supreme Court will not and 
should not permit such a contraction of its purposes. 
This result is reached by the majority although they admit 
that in the case of an unlawful search and seizure third per-
sons have standing to urge an illegal search although their 
rights are not directly violated. (People v. Martin, 45 Ca1.2d 
755 [290 P.2d 855].) The majority assert, correctly, that the 
basis of this rule is that otherwise "the deterrent effect of the 
exclusionary rule would be seriously weakened." Certainly 
one can say, with even greater emphasis, that the rule here-
adopted by the majority will seriously impair the deterrent 
effect on improper police activities intended by Escobedo. A 
reading of Escobedo, Dorado, and Miranda demonstrates that 
the rules there adopted were adopted largely to deter im-
proper police activities, just as the unlawful search and sei-
zure rules were adopted for the same purpose. The same rule 
should be applied to both situations. 
The majority also imply that if the confession had been 
coerced from the Jacksons, Varnum would have standing to 
attack it. But what the majority overlook is that the rules 
adopted in Escobedo, Dorado and Miranda were adopted be-
cause of the fear that a confession without the required warn-
ings is suspect as coercive. Certainly, the United States Su-
preme Court in Escobedo and Miranda applied the coercive 
confession rules. 'rhey should also be applied here. 
(1 
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The majority seem to think that the problem here involved 
differs from the unlawful search and seizure situation because 
the search and seizure was ab initio illegal, while here the 
original interrogation of the Jacksons was "lawful," and 
would become unlawful only when and if the confession or its 
fruits were introduced into evidence against the Jacksons. 
Since the confession was never introduced against the J ack-
sons no error was committed. Thus it is said: "Noncoercivc 
questioning is not in itself unlawful" and again, "there is 
nothing unlawful in questioning unwarned snspects so long as 
the police refrain from physically and psychologically coer-
cive tactics." Such "reasoning" discloses a misconception of 
the rules under discussion. Improper interrogation, without 
the requisite warnings, violated the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights of the witness. It is "unlawful" to interrogate a 
suspect without giving him the required warnings from the 
very moment of the first question. The right of privacy recog-
nized in Escobedo and Miranda has been violated the moment 
interrogation starts. The fact that the most important sanc-
tion imposed for violating that right of privacy is inadmissi-
bility of the confession into evidence, and that the defendant 
cannot complain in his criminal trial unless the confession is 
introduced, does not make the interrogation lawful. The same 
can be said about an unlawful search and seizure; yet there is 
no doubt that the unlawful search is unlawful when commit-
ted, and not when the fruits of such search are introducerl 
into evidence. The one thing made crystal clear by Escobedo 
and certainly by the explanation of that case in Miranda is 
that it is unlawful to interrogate without giving the required 
warnings. 
What the sanction may be if the confession is not intro-
duced we need not now determine. All that we have to deter-
mine is that the interrogation was unlawful. Violation of the 
}'ourth Amendment occurs at the time of the unlawful search. 
Violation of the Fifth Amendment occurs the moment defend-
ant is induced to give incriminating information. Violation of 
the Sixth Amendment occurs the moment the accused is 
interrogated without being informed of the right to counsel. 
What the majority fail to realize is that Escobedo, Dorado 
and Miranda pushed back the impact of the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments from the courtroom to the police station. 
Carried to its logical conclusion the rule that interrogation 
is not unlawful until the results of that interrogation are 
) 
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introduced in evidence in a criminal trial, suggested by the 
majority, woulU mean that the privilege against self-
incrimination does not exist when a witness is interrogated by 
a legislative committee because legislative committees are not 
engaged in criminal trials. I am sure the majority intended no 
such ridiculous result, but that would seem to be the result of 
their reasoning. 
In support of its contention that the violation of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination does not occur until the evi-
dence is used against the accused the majority rely on 
Murphy v. Waterfront Com. 0/ New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 
78-79 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 694-695, 84 S.Ct. 1594]. That is the 
case that repudiated the old rule that one jurisdiction could 
compel a witness to testify where his testimony, although not 
incriminatory in that jurisdiction might incriminate him 
under the laws of another jurisdiction. The state had granted 
the witness immunity under state law, but he claimed the 
privilege on the ground that his testimony would incriminate 
him under federal law. 
It was held that under its grant of immunity the state 
could compel the witness to testify and that the witness' 
privilege would be protected by precluding the federal au-
thorities from using the testimony in a criminal prosecution 
against him. But this holding does not support the thesis oj 
the majority. The court adopted the rule announced t( 
"accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Govern· 
ments in investigating" crime. Unless the state under iu 
immunity statute could take the testimony the whole purposl 
of the immunity statutes would be defeated in many, if no 
most, situations for which they were designed. No such com 
peting state and federal interests are llere involved. 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 [12 L.Ed.2c 
246, 250-251, 84 8. Ct. 1199], is alsO' relied upon by th 
majority to support their conclusion that the right of th 
accused to counsel is not violated until the prosecutin 
authorities attempt to use the words elicited while the accuse. 
was without a lawyer. It is true that that case states that th 
accused was denied his right to counsel when the confessio 
was introduced. But there is nothing in that opinion to ind 
cate that there was no violation of the accused's rights if tll 
confession is not used at trial. Tn Escobedo where the accuse 
demanded the right to counsel the rights of the accused weI 
violated immediately upon that request bl·ing uenied. 
~, 
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Implicit in the holding that noncoercive questioning is 
lawful until the confession is introduced in a criminal trial is 
the concept that such noncoercive interrogation is desirable 
and to be encouraged. To the contrary Escobedo, Dorado anti 
Miranda tell us in no uncertain terms that all such interroga-
tions are to be discouraged. Insofar as we permit the fruits of 
an interrogation in violation of those cases to be introduced 
into evidence we are encouraging not deterring unlawful 
police activity. 
The practical effects of such a holding cannot be minimized. 
What the majority have done is to attempt to turn a doctrine 
protective of constitutional rights into a rule of evidence. It 
must be remembered that the rule of the majority holding 
that interrogation without warnings is lawful nut only 
encourages such interrogations but also encourages officers to 
ignore express requests for counsel and to ignore assertions of 
reliance on the privilege against self-incrimination. Under 
Dorado and Miranda the same rules are applicable to both 
situations. In Miranda the court unequivocally covered the 
situation under discussion in the following language. (Mimn-
da v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, at pp. 473-474 [16 L.Ed.2d 694 at 
p. 723, 86 8.0t. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974].) "If the individual 
indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during ques-
tioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation 
must cease. [Footnote omitted.] At this point he has shown 
that lIe intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; 
any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege 
cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or 
otherwise .... If the individual states that he wants an 
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is 
present. " 
I interpret those words as limitations on police activity-
the majority do not. A conscientious police officer must, of 
course, try to obtain evidence by every lawful means. Now he 
is impliedly told by the majority that, where there are multi-
ple suspects, he may, without giving the required warnings 
and despite the suspect's request for counselor desire to 
remain silent, interrogate one suspect in violation of these 
rights in the hope of getting admissible evidence against thf' 
other suspects. The majority opinion can be interpreted as not 
only condoning but in effect encouraging such violation of 
fundament..'11 constitutional rights. 
I would hold the admission of the gun was error, and under 
) 
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the facts clearly prejudicial. I would reverse the entire judg-
ment appealed from. 
BURKE, J.-I concur in the affirmance of the judgment as 
to guilt but dissent from the reversal of the judgment as to 
penalty. In my opinion it is not reasonably probable that a 
result more favorable to defendant would have been reached 
had the asserted error relating to the testimony of Thomas 
Hanks not been committed. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13;· Peo-
ple v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243].) Hanks 
testified that he, defendant and others committed two rob-
beries on the street, that defendant was unarmed on both 
occasions, and that on neither occasion was the victim hurt. 
These offenses were of a minor character compared to the 
other crimes defendant committed, and they added little to 
the pros~cution 's case. It appears that defendant brutally 
killed his robbery victim, J ames Merrill, by shooting him 
twice in the back after robbing him and kidnaping him for 
the purpose of robbery. Defendant also committed an assault 
with an intent to commit robbery upon James Fields, and 
during the commission of that offense after Fields had fallen 
defendant pointed his revolver directly at Fields and pulled 
the trigger. In addition defendant has twice been convicted of 
the unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle. 
Furthermore, at the penalty trial the court informed the 
jury that "the general instructions having to do with credi. 
bility of witnesses and so forth [given at the guilt trial] 
apply to this phase of the case as well as to the other one," 
and at the guilt trial the court fully instructed the jury 
regarding the law relating to an accomplice's testimony. The 
instructions informed the jury that the testimony of an 
accomplice is to be viewed with distrust and that a conviction 
may not be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it 
is corroborated, and the instructions further defined an 
accomplice, stated that if the offenses involving Merrill were 
committed by anyone then as a matter of law Hanks was an 
Hccomplice, and explained what corroboration is sufficient. In 
view of these instrnetions and the further instruction given at 
the penalty trial that evidence of other crimes may not be 
('onsidered as evidence unless proved beyond a reasonable-
doubt, it does not appear that the alleged error was preju-
dicial. 
-Reporter's Note: Amendment adopted November 8, 1966. 
) 
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Under the circumstances, in my opinion the alleged error 
relating to Hanks' testimony did not result in a miscarriage 
of justice, and I would affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 28, 
1967. White, J.,. sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself 
disqualified. Peter:s, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted.: 
